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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 15,2008, Katherine H. Harris (Harris) served upon Independent School
District No.1 and the Idaho State Insurance Fund (Employer and Surety) a workers'
compensation complaint, alleging entitlement to medical, time loss, impairment, and disability
benefits. An Idaho Industrial Commission referee conducted a bifurcated hearing on December
3,2010, dealing only with the issues of causation, and Harris' entitlement to time loss benefits
and additional medical care. All other issues were reserved.
Harris appeals the Commission's decision denying her additional benefits. The
Commission found that Harris failed to prove that her injury was anything more than a strain of
her lumbar and cervical spine; failed to prove that she was entitled to care after February 19,
2008, the date of the Employer and Surety's first independent medical examination; and failed to
prove that the injury accelerated, aggravated or lit up her degenerative spine condition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A detailed recitation of the treatment record is necessary to an understanding of the
Commission's decision.
Harris had a long history of radiating lumbar pain following a 1991 motor vehicle
accident. See Defendants Exhibit 11A, pg.l O. Harris' employment required her to be examined
regularly to determine her fitness to drive a school bus. Beginning in 2003, it was noted that
Harris suffered from "chronic low back pain." See id at 33,43,48,84.
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On the date of injury, (January 9, 2008), Harris was initially examined at St. Joseph
Regional Medical Center, where she stated she fell when her back gave out and that her back had
been sore for the "past couple of days". See id. at 105-06. Diagnostic films were taken and were
unremarkable. See id. The physician located no signs of head or neck trauma, no midline neck
pain, and no lumbar tenderness. See id. Harris did indicate she was experiencing pain in both her
arms and legs. See id. Harris was diagnosed with a minor neck strain and knee contusion. See id.
Harris' primary care provider had for some time been Carmen Stolte, a nurse practitioner.
Ms. Stolte first examined Harris five days after the date of injury, and diagnosed Harris with a
cervical and lumbar strain. See id. at 109. Ms. Stolte referred Harris to physical therapy, noting
on the therapy prescription that the diagnosis was "cervical and lumbar strain." See Defendants'
Exhibit 4/D, pg.l.
Harris was first seen for physical therapy on January 16' 2008, just five days after the
injury. See id. at 3. Upon interview and examination, the therapist noted "My impression is that
the patient is suffering from a lumbar and cervical strain." Id. At the conclusion of her second
therapy appointment the next day, Harris was demonstrating full cervical range of motion. See

id. Just four days later, the therapist noted that Harris demonstrated good cervical range of
motion and that such motion did not reproduce any cervical radiculopathy. See id.
That same day Harris returned to Ms. Stolte for follow-up care. See Defendants' Exhibit

11A, at 110-12. As before, x-rays were taken, which again showed degenerative changes of the
cervical and lumbar spine. See id. Ms. Stolte's original diagnosis of acute lumbar and cervical
strain remained unchanged. See id.
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Normal cervical range of motion was again noted during Harris' January 28, 2008,
physical therapy session. See Defendants' Exhibit 4/D at 5. That same day Harris returned to
Ms. Stolte. See Defendant's Exhibit 1A at 114-16. Her medications were adjusted, but the
diagnosis - lumbar and cervical strain

remained unchanged. See id. The diagnosis did not

change following three more appointments with Ms. Stolte. See id. at 115, 118, 125, 128.
An MRI was taken February 7, 2008, approximately one month after the injury. See id. at
120. Degenerative changes of the cervical spine were once again noted. See id. No acute or
traumatic findings were noted, but multilevel disc changes of the lumbar spine were noted. See
id. at 120-23.

On February 19,2008, Harris was seen by Dr. Warren Adams at the request of the
Employer and Surety for an independent medical examination. See Defendants' Exhibit 8/H.
Harris testified that Dr. Adams spent an hour and a half examining and observing her. See Tr, p.
76, L. 3-6. Dr. Adams noted troubling discrepancies in observed range of motion of the cervical
spine and the tested range of motion of the cervical spine, describing it at one time as "grossly
inconsistent". See Defendant's Exhibit 8/H, at 14, 18.
Dr. Adams did not observe any objective findings to corroborate Harris' subjective
complaints. See id. at 17. Dr. Adams determined that Harris' lumbar symptoms predated the
industrial injury. See id. at 18. Dr. Adams' diagnosis was cervical and lumbar pain, essentially
mirroring Ms. Stolte's initial diagnosis. See id. at 17. He did not feel any additional treatment
was warranted. See id. When later asked for further clarification of his opinion, Dr. Adams
responded in an April 29, 2008, letter that "a detailed physical examination did not identify any
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objective findings to corroborate her subjective complaints. Her physical examination did
identifY non-physiological findings as well as inconsistent findings." Id. at 19. Dr. Adams went
on to say that "my physical examination does not identify any objective findings to corroborate
her subjective complaints". Id. at 21.
The Employer and Surety terminated benefits effective February 19,2008, the date of Dr.
Adams' independent medical examination.
In Harris' next four visits with Ms. Stolte, her condition remained unchanged. See
Defendants' Exhibit IIA, at 130-31,133-35,136-41.
On April 3, 2008, Harris contacted Ms. Stolte's office requesting additional pain
medication. See Defendants' Exhibit 1A at 144. Harris stated she had spilled some of her
medication in the sink. See id. Ms. Stolte was not available on that date to write a prescription.
Therefore, Harris was seen by Dr. Stoutin the following day at Express Care. See id. at 145. A
prescription for Hydrocodone was written. See id. Dr. Stoutin discussed with Harris a " ...
concern over the quantity of Hydrocodone being used." Id. at 146.
Harris was seen again by Ms. Stolte on April 8,2007 and April 22, 2008. See id. at 14753. Her condition and treatment remained unchanged. See id.
On May 2, 2008, Dr. Gregory Dietrich corresponded with Harris' primary care provider.
See Defendants' Exhibit 6/F, pg. 1. Harris had requested that Dr. Dietrich review her medical

records to determine whether she was a surgical candidate. See Tr, p. 98, L. 4-7. Having
reviewed Harris' MRl, Dr. Dietrich confirmed Dr. Adams' opinion regarding treatment options

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

6

stating, "I do not think there is much to be considered surgically." See Defendants' Exhibit 6/F
at 1.
Harris was seen three more times by Ms. Stolte between May 5, 2008, and June 3, 2008.

See Defendants' Exhibit 1A at 156-68. Her diagnosis and treatment remained unchanged. See id.
On June 13, 2008, Harris went to the emergency room of St. Joseph Regional Medical
Center complaining of an apparent spontaneous exacerbation of her back pain. See id. at 169-70.
Harris did not complain of radicular symptoms. See id. Pain medication was administered. See

id. The note also reads "I have advised the patient that I think she needs some more movement
specifically walking. She argues this point quite a bit. She thinks she should be doing nothing to
get better." Jd.
Harris subsequently sought treatment from Dr. John Demakas of Spokane. See
Defendants' Exhibit 7G. HalTis admitted at hearing that she went to Dr. Demakas because she
did not like what Dr. Dietrich had told her. See Tr, p. 98, L. 18-21. While it is true that Dr.
Demakas believed that Harris' pre-existing degenerative changes in the neck and low back were
rendered symptomatic by her fall, he also did not initially believe that surgery was warranted.

See Defendants' Exhibit 7G at 4. That opinion was consistent with that of Dr. Adams and Dr.
Dietrich. Dr. Demakas ordered continued physical therapy, pain treatment, and a bone scan. See

id. at 4-6.
Harris again presented at St. Joseph Regional Medical Center on July 6, 2008,
complaining that she had run out of pain medication. See Defendants Exhibit 1/A at 180-81.
Again, it was noted that Harris had no radicular symptoms. See id. Although she had previously
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informed other care providers she was having bladder control issues, no complaints related to
bladder control were noted. See id A prescription for pain medication was written with a
recommendation to follow up with her primary care provider. See id
Regular follow-up treatment with Ms. Stolte and/or the pain clinic continued from July to
October of 2008. See id at 182-204. Little or no change in Harris' symptoms or treatment was
noted. See id Harris at one point complained of cervical pain and symptoms which fluctuated
from the right to left side. See Defendants' Exhibit 5/E, pg. 36.
Cervical x-rays and MRI were done October 16,2008. See Defendants' Exhibit lIA at
204-06. Degenerative changes were again noted. See id
On November 1,2008, Harris again returned to St. Joseph's Emergency Department,
complaining of pain. See Defendants' Exhibit 3/C, pg. 58-59. No lower extremity symptoms
were noted. See id Harris requested a change in her pain medication. See id The on-call
physician wrote a prescription for 30 tables of Percocet, but requested that Harris call her treating
physician. See id
On December 24,2008, Ms. Stolte required Harris' to enter into a "Patient Contract
Regarding Chronic Narcotic Use for Non-Malignant Pain." See Defendants' Exhibit 11A at 21718. That contract reads in relevant part:
2. There will be no change in my prescription over the phone or between regular
monthly visits. This includes replacement of lost/stolen prescriptions ...
5. Only one physician will be able to prescribe narcotics at any given time. I
understand that the above named physician has agreed to provide this treatment. ..
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9. I understand that if there is evidence of drug hoarding or selling of drugs,
receiving these drugs from other physicians or unauthorized increases in the
amount I am using, these medications will be discontinued.

Id
On January 23, 2009, approximately one month after the narcotics contract was executed,
Harris again went to St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center requesting pain medication. See id. at
230-32. The care provider had a "very frank" discussion with Harris regarding the terms of her
narcotics contract. Id. Harris admitted that she ran out of her narcotic medications four days
early. See id. Harris also admitted that her husband would occasionally "set aside" her
medications so she would not overuse them. Id. Harris continued in follow-up care with Ms.
Stolte, including regular pain medication refills.
On April 1 1, 2009, while visiting family in Washington state, Harris walked into the
Bogachiel Clinic in Forks, Washington seeking pain medication. See id. at 256. The record of
that visit reads in relevant part:
Comes into walk-in. States is a sister of one of my regular patients. She is in town
because her father passed away. States she flew to Seattle a week ago from Idaho. Her
prescription meds were in her luggage and she noted that one half of them were missing
when she arrived here. She did NOT repOli this to police. She states she is out now. She
states she normally takes Demerol 100mg-2 of them 4 times daily. She also takes Soma
three times daily."
Id. (Emphasis in original).

The physician checked with a local pharmacy in Forks, and determined that Harris had
obtained 90 Soma tablets just two days earlier. See id. The care provider would not prescribe
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Demerol as requested. S'ee id Forty (40) Hydrocodone were prescribed. Harris was encouraged
to contact law enforcement regarding the alleged theft. See id
Just five days after forty (40) Hydrocodone were prescribed in Washington, Harris
contacted her primary care provider back in Lewiston and requested Hydrocodone because she
stated was having withdrawals and could not make it down to the clinic. See id. at 257.
Hydrocodone was denied and Harris' Demerol prescription was refilled. See id.
Two days later, Harris presented at Express Care in Lewiston again seeking more pain
medication, and was seen by Dr. Lott. See id. at 259-60. The record of the encounter is
instructive, and therefore is quoted from at length:
Kathy presents to Express Care today with complicated complaint of having her
narcotics stolen twice in the past week when she was flying through SeaTac
Airport. Patient states her husband, John, manages her narcotics as she has
"overtaken" her narcotics in the past. Patient states that she flew to Seattle by
herself to stay with her mother and sister. She states that when she left Lewiston
she had 215 Demerol tablets and her Demerol pill bottle. Patient states that while
she was with her mother and sister and she was asleep, her mother and sister took
her Demerol pill bottle and counted the pills and told her that there were only 150.
Patient states that someone at the airport broke her brand new suitcase and stole
her Demerol tablets. She states they also stole her Soma. She tells me "half the
bottle of Soma was gone."... Patient states that she then flew back from Seattle
through SeaTac Airport to the Lewiston Airport. She states that while she was in
the waiting area in the SeaTac Airport to fly she left her overnight bag in the
waiting area. She gives a long and complicated story about taking some grass out
of her overnight bag, that is a 40 year tradition that she and her family have, her
father recently died, etc., etc. She is quite tangential and goes on about the
"stupid nasty plane flight." Through all of this she left her overnight bag in the
waiting area in the SeaTac Airport. It was not stolen from her possession, but
rather she left it there. She states that when she got back to the Lewiston
Regional Airport she realized it was missing. She states that she called the airline
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and was told that they found an overnight bag. Patient states that the airline
representative asked the patient for her credit card number and told her that they
would charge her credit card to have the overnight bag Fed Ex'd to her residence.
Patient states that there has been no credit card activity by the airline to try to get
her overnight bag back to her. Patient is very upset by this and states that she will
be filing police claims against both the SeaTac and Lewiston Airport. Patient
readily admits it is her own negligence that her overnight bag did not make it
home with her as she left it in the waiting area. Patient states that she is now out
of all her medications because all of her medications were in her bag that has not
been sent to her from the SeaTac Airport. She states that she has taken two
Demerol tablets so far today. She states she only has two more. She is very
concerned about withdrawing .... Patient states that she must have more Demerol
immediately or she will withdraw. She states if! do not give it to her she will
have to go to the emergency department.... Patient is quite tangential, talks about
all of her pain syndromes. She talks about why her husband doles out her
medication to her. Her husband did not go on this flight with her. She flew by
herself, stayed with her mom and sister, and her mother and sister were supposed
to be managing her medications. They were apparently "checking" them and
counting them while the patient was asleep.
Id.

Twice in that record it states Harris is concerned about going through withdrawal if she
does not receive pain medication. See id. Harris was given enough Demerol to carry her through
her scheduled appointment with Ms. Stolte. See id. Dr. Lott advised Ms. Harris" ...
specifically, clearly, and repeatedly that I would not give her any further narcotics, no
exceptions. She may not call Express Care for a refill". Id.
Ms. Stolte twice refilled Ms. Harris' Demerol prescriptions within a month of her
Express Care visit. See id. at 267-68.
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Harris was next seen by Dr. Demakas on May 14, 2009. See Defendants' Exhibit 7/0 at
21. Dr. Demakas noted continued degenerative disc disease with neck and arm pain. See id. Dr.
Demakas recommended a multilevel disc fusion, which was performed on June 10,2009. See id.
at 22, 28. See also Defendants' Exhibit 11A at 269-70.
On June 17,2009 Harris returned to Ms. Stolte, and reported that her neck pain was
worse than it was before the surgery. See Defendants' Exhibit lIA at 276.
Harris' pain medications were refilled consistently between July 1 and August 5,2009.
See id. at 278-84. On September 8,2009 Harris contacted her care provider requesting an

increase in her pain medication because her back pain was getting worse. See id. at 288-90.
On October 21, 2009 Harris presented to St. Joseph Regional Medical Center for a CT
scan of her cervical spine at the request of Dr. Demakas. See Defendants' Exhibit 3/C at 69-71.
The record of that diagnostic report reads in relevant part "[fjollow up from cervical fusion,
increasing neck pain and headaches." See id.
On October 28, 2009 Harris returned to Ms. Stolte complaining of neck and back pain, as
well as terrible headaches which had been occurring for over a week. See Defendants' Exhibit
11A at 300-02. Harris reported that her pain medication was not helping at all, and referenced an

apparently ineffective effort to control her pain with injectable Demerol at the hospital. See id.
Harris was given a prescription for 30 Percocet tablets and was cautioned to only use them for
very severe pain. See id.
On December 26, 2009 Harris returned to Express Care, complaining of cluster
headaches and neck pain. See id. at 297-98. Harris told the physician that she had neck surgery
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six months prior and that her headaches had been getting worse in the "last couple months". Id
Harris was injected with Demerol. See id
Harris was examined by Dr. Larson on August 17,2010. See Defendants' Exhibit 101J.
Dr. Larson is a Board Certified neurosurgeon. with an active neurosurgical practice in Coeur
d' Alene and Post Falls. Dr. Larson performed a physical examination, reviewed the imaging
studies to that date, and reviewed Ms. Harris' prior medical records dating back to 1991. See
Larson Deposition Transcript, Vol. I, p. 5, L. 22-24; Vol. I, p. 6, L. 2-23; See Larson Deposition
Exhibit No. 1.
Dr. Larson found that Harris had degenerative disc disease in both the cervical and
lumbar spine. See Defendants' Exhibit IOIJ at 3. In an opinion consistent with that of Dr.
Adams, (and with Ms. Stolte's initial diagnoses), Dr. Larson found that Harris had suffered a
minor neck strain and minor lumbar strain. See id. Dr. Larson did not believe that the surgery
performed by Dr. Demakas was related to the industrial injury. See id Finally, Dr. Larson did
not believe that additional treatment for Ms. Harris' cervical or lumbar spine was warranted. See
id

Dr. Larson amplified his written opinion in his post-hearing deposition. Dr. Larson
believed that Ms. Harris had pre-existing degenerative disc disease, and that the injury only
temporarily aggravated that condition. See Larson Deposition Transcript, Vol. I, p. 22, L. 16-21;
Vol. I, p. 26, L. 9-18. Dr. Larson found claimant to be neurologically intact; in other words,
there was no objective finding to support Ms. Harris' subjective complaints. See id at Vol. I, p.
11,L.3-15.
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In addition, Dr. Larson reviewed Dr. Demakas' records and interpreted those records as
confirming that there was no neurologic deficit. See id. at Vol. I, p. 12, L. 13-25; Vol I, p. 13 L.
1-12.
Having reviewed the Demakas records, including the operative report, Dr. Larson did not
believe that claimant had acute findings. Upon reviewing the operative report, Dr. Larson
described Han-is' cervical spine disease as an "extremely degenerative condition." Id. at Vol. II,
p. 86, L. 10-25, Vol II, p. 87, L. 1-2.
Dr. Larson believed that the surgery performed by Dr. Demakas was unrelated to the
industrial injury, and was not reasonable or effective treatment for a neck strain. In describing
the success of the surgery, Dr. Larson testified "she's no better, she says she's worse." Id. at
Vol. I, p. 18, L. 6-20; Vol. I, p. 20, L. 17-25; Vol. I, p. 21, L. 1-3.
Having reviewed all of Ms. Harris' records for the preceding seventeen years Dr. Larson
also noted that Han-is had multiple preexisting back complaints which had been inconsistently
addressed by her treating physicians. See id. at Vol. II, p. 83, L.17-25; Vol. II, p. 84, L. 1-20.
(Contrary to the assertion of Harris, the Referee did not find that she was "faking." The only
time that word was used in the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommendation was
when the Referee wrote "Stating an opinion with surprising frankness, Dr. Larson testified he
believes claimant is 'faking"'. R. p. 8,'31.)
Harris testified that her headaches, and hand and finger numbness began after her cervical
surgery. She also testified that she began taking Topamax for headaches since the cervical
surgery. See Tr. p. 82, L. 11-25; p. 97, L. 5-15. Harris also testified she now takes up to 8

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

14

Hydrocodone per day, but admitted upon questioning that she had already taken four tablets
before the 9 AM hearing began. See Tr. p. 73, L. 6-8; p.99, L. 4-8. The day before her cervical
surgery Harris' hydrocodone prescription called for her to take only 1-2 tablets per dose, every 6
to 8 hours. See Defendants' Exhibit l/A at 274.
As discussed by Harris in her opening brief, she was examined by Dr. Robert Colburn on
October 21,2010 for another independent medical evaluation. Dr. Colburn is of the opinion that
Harris' preexisting degenerative lumbar and cervical condition was aggravated by the fall.
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ISSUES ON ApPEAL

1. Whether there was substantial, competent evidence to support the Commission's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law?
2. Whether Harris is entitled to attorney fees before the Commission or on appeal?
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ARGUMENT
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW

It is the role of the Industrial Commission, not this Court, to determine the weight
and credibility of testimony and to resolve conflicting interpretations of
testimony. Lopez v. State, Industr. Special Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174,30 P.3d
952 (2001). On appeal, this Court will not conduct a de novo review of the
evidence or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from
the evidence presented. Id. This Court will not disturb the Commission's factual
findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Konvalinka
v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477,95 P.3d 628 (2004). Substantial and
competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion. Id
Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 565, 130 P.3d 1097, 1103 (2006)
1. The opinions of Dr. Adams and Dr. Larson are relevant evidence which a

reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion that Harris is not entitled to
additional benefits.

In denying benefits, the Commission accepted the opinions of Employer's experts. "The
Industrial Commission, as the factfinder, is free to determine the weight to be given the
testimony of a medical expert. (citation omitted). We will not disturb the Commission's
conclusions as to the weight and credibility of expert testimony unless such conclusions are
clearly erroneous." Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 566, 130 P.3d 1097, 1104
(2006).
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Harris asserts that the Commission erroneously accepted the opinion of Dr. Warren
Adams. Harris submitted for consideration nearly 50 pages of records attacking Dr. Adams. The
Referee reviewed all of those materials, and wrote "claimant's ad hominem attack on Dr. Adams
is noted and was seriously considered. However, claimant failed to show a persuasive factual
basis upon which to find Dr. Adams' examination or opinions to be inaccurate in this instance".
R, p. 44, , 62.

The Commission did not accept the argument that because Dr. Adams was not persuasive
in one case, he was deemed unpersuasive in all cases, including this one. Such a finding was not
111

error.

In rejecting the opinion of Harris' experts, the Commission also found the records of Ms.
Stolte, Harris' primary treatment provider, to be "internally inconsistent", and therefore open to
doubt. R, p. 39-40, '43. (see also R. p. 40, '45.)

Dr. Adams opinion was supported by Dr. Larson. These physicians were found to have
" ... based their opinions upon the absence of objective findings at each of their examinations,
upon the absence of objective findings in diagnostic imaging studies, upon 'gross
inconsistencies' between [Harris'] subjective reports and findings upon examination and between
[Harris'] subjective range of motion in her neck when distracted versus when focused upon." Id.
at 38, , 30. The opinions of these experts are clearly relevant. It was reasonable for the
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Commission to accept those opinions in reaching the conclusion that Harris need for additional
treatment was not related to the industrial injury.

2. The record contains substantial and competent evidence to support the conclusion
that Harris is not credible.

The medical opinions cited by Harris in support of her claim for additional medical care
are founded upon the symptom description and history provided by Harris. While acknowledging
that Harris had suffered a cervical and lumbar strain, the Commission noted that "Whether either
strain had a permanent, temporary, or no effect at all upon her preexisting upper and lower back
conditions depends upon how much of [Harris'] prior medical records were available to a
particular medical care provider or expert and whether he or she believed [Harris] reported
history and allegations of pain." Id. at 43 ';58. Therefore, in some measure the question is
whether Harris is credible.

It is well established that the Commission may look to drug-seeking behavior in assessing

credibility. (See Freeborg v. Target and Old Republic Insurance. IC 2005-835, (2009 WL
5850540) and Henderson v. Alliant Tech Systems, Inc. and Birmingham Fire Insurance of

Pennsylvania, IC 2002-013729 (2007 WL 4299187»).

The record contains substantial, indisputable evidence of drug seeking behavior.
Repeatedly, Harris went from her primary care provider, to the emergency room of her local
hospital, to the local urgent care clinic seeking pain medication. The medical record is rife with
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references of concern about Harris' use of pain medications. Defendant's Ex. 11 A, at ] 45-] 46,
217-218,230-232,256-257,259-260; See also Defendants' Ex. 3/C, at 58-59.

By her own admission, HalTis' family monitored her use of pain medications. Harris'
drug-seeking behavior is perhaps best established by her care provider's requirement of a
eontract to monitor and restrict her ability to obtain pain medication. One wonders why Harris'
treatment provider would require such a contract if there was no concern regarding the improper
use of narcotic medications.
Additionally, Harris apparently believed she would suffer withdrawal if not given
requested pain medication. To accept the notion that she was not drug-seeking, one must ignore
her own statements to treatment providers. If she was not drug-seeking, why would she express
on multiple occasions concerns about withdrawal? If Harris was addicted, her concerns about
withdrawal were warranted, and she was drug-seeking in order to feed her addiction. If she was
not addicted, then she was dishonest with her treatment providers in an illicit effort to obtain
narcotic pain medication. Either way her credibility is undercut.
The Commission did not take issue with Harris' observational credibility, instead finding
that she lacked substantive credibility. The Commission, in adopting the Referree's proposed
Findings, determined that Harris' " ... credibility is significantly established by her relatively
long work history and good work record with employer." R, p. 11, ~52. Harris' observational
credibility was apparently also established, in that the referee observed that she " ... was
physically uncomfortable whether the focus was or was not upon her." Id. at p. 11, ~52.
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However, the Commission gave greater weight to Harris' voluminous medical records
than to her own description of her symptoms and treatment. " ... [Harris] is an inconsistent
historian. Contemporaneously made medical records are deemed to be of greater weight than
[Harris'] memory of her pains, condition, or other medical history. Moreover, her variable
reports of where and how much she hurts tends to undercut the weight to be attached to her
subjective complaints." R, p. 11,

~52.

Those concerns, coupled with evidence of Harris' drug seeking behavior, cast
considerable doubt upon Harris' credibility. Substantial, credible evidence supported the
Commission's finding that Harris lacked credibility.

3. The Employer and Surety provided Harris reasonable treatment

Idaho Code § 72-432(1) requires the Employer and Surety to provide Harris "such
reasonable medical, surgical, or other attendance or treatment, a nurse and hospital service,
medicine, crutches and apparatus, as may be reasonably required by the employees physician or
needed immediately after an injury ... And for a reasonable time thereafter. In determining
whether proposed medical care is reasonable, one must consider whether (1) gradual
improvement resulted from the treatment received, (2) the treatment was required by the treating
physician, and (3) the treatment received was within the physician's standard of practice. Magee
v Thompson Creek Mining Co., 142 Idaho 761, 133 P.3d 1226 (2006), rehearing denied.
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Harris continues to experience neck pain since surgery. Dr. Larson and Dr. Colburn both
report that Harris told them she continues to have neck pain. Harris told Dr. Colburn that her
headaches and neck pain developed approximately three months after the neck surgery. See
Defendants' Exhibit KJ11, p. 6. A close reading of Harris' medication usage would lead one to
conclude that she is in more pain now than she was before the neck surgery. She continues to tell
her care providers she is in pain, including neck pain. New symptoms, including headaches, have
appeared since the surgery. Clearly, gradual improvement has not resulted from the treatment,
and the treatment is therefore not reasonable.

Harris' chronic preexisting lumbar condition is well documented, and is therefore not
related to the industrial injury. Substantial, competent evidence supports the conclusion that
additional treatment for that condition is not warranted.

4. Harris is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs.

Harris seeks an award of attorney fees and costs before the Commission and on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-704. That code section calls for a punitive award of fees and costs if
the Employer and Surety umeasonably denied benefits or compensation. For the reasons stated
above, the termination of benefits was not unreasonable. An award of fees and costs whether
before the Commission or on appeal is unwarranted. See Fife v. Home Depot, Inc. 151 Idaho
509,515 (2011).
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CONCLUSION

The initial diagnosis of a cervical and lumbar strain was confirmed by substantial,
competent evidence. The conclusion that Harris merely had degenerative changes in her cervical
and lumbar spine was likewise confirmed by substantial, competent evidence. The need for
cervical surgery and additional treatment for the cervical and lumbar spine was refuted by
substantial, competent evidence. For the foregoing reasons, the Employer and Surety
respectfully petition the Court to uphold the Commission's findings that Harris failed to prove
that her injury was anything more than a strain of her lumbar and cervical spine; failed to prove
that she was entitled to care after February 19, 2008; and failed to prove that the injury
accelerated, aggravated or lit up her degenerative spine condition.
DATED this

23

day of October, 2012.
MOSMAN LAW OFFICES,

Attorney for Defendants/Respondents
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